United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit court in Chicago, in 520S. Michigan Ave. Associates, Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1, 13-1938, 2014 WL 3720253 (7th Cir. July 29, 2014), recently
found that that Unite Here Local 1, the “Union”,
engaged in secondary activity that was coercive, threatening and harassing in
its tactics to settle a long time strike against Congress Plaza Hotel, the “Hotel”,
in Chicago.
The
Union began engaging in secondary activity—i.e., targeting organizations that
had made arrangements to reserve large blocks of rooms or space at the Hotel,
in the hopes that they would cancel their plans and thus pressure the Hotel to
end the strike. The Union would send delegations, consisting of striking Hotel
workers and Union staff in groups of between two and ten people, to the stores
and offices of these potential Hotel patrons. Delegates were instructed to
impress upon the decision-makers of these organizations, both orally and
through written materials, the Union’s position in the strike and its
disapproval of the target organization’s plans to use the Hotel.
The
Hotel claims that the Union delegations crossed the line into unlawful
secondary labor activity, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) and 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). It claims that, instead
of utilizing persuasion, the Union coerced the Hotel’s customers into cancelling
their agreements to book rooms at the Congress.
The
court held that some of the union's conduct was lawful. However, in some cases, the court found that
the union’s secondary activity moved beyond basic persuasion and engaged into
unlawful and coercive tact’s by attempting to interfere with the hotel’s
business operations.
The Court
sought to answer the question whether the union's conduct was persuasive, (permissible
by law) or coercive (illegal)?
The Law of Secondary
Labor Activity
The Hotel alleges that the Union engaged in unfair labor
practices prohibited under federal law. See 29 U.S.C. § 187. Specifically, the
Union allegedly violated 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(ii)(B),
which bars certain labor activity against a secondary target. That
provision is part of “Congress’ striking of the delicate balance between union
freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and
consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife.” NLRB
v. Retail Store Emp. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617–18 (1980) (Safeco)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part). The
statute makes it unlawful for a union “to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce” where “an object thereof is … forcing or requiring
any person to cease … doing business with another person.” 29 U.S.C.
§158(b)(4)(ii)(B). The statute
explicitly states that this prohibition does not apply to “any primary strike
or primary picketing.” Id. Section
158(b)(4) contains a proviso noting that the above section does not “prohibit
publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public … that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute.” In other words, striking against an
employer engaged in a labor dispute with a union is acceptable, as is
publicizing such a strike. But coercion against neutral parties is forbidden.
Some of the Union’s Behavior
found to be in violation of the law:
While the court determined that, in most cases, the union
acted within the confines of the law, the court also found the Union’s behavior
toward ATI, IHA, and the Comic Expo as
potentially illegal:
American
Tango Institute (ATI): The Hotel reasonably demonstrated
that the Union coerced ATI into abandoning its business with the Hotel. There
are two particularly objectionable aspects to the Union’s alleged conduct.
First, even after ATI president Roldan had told the Union twice, once by phone
and also in a heated, in-person meeting, that he was not persuaded to aid their
cause, delegates apparently snuck into ATI’s offices unobserved and dropped
literature in its offices on several occasions. President Netza Roldan
testified that the Union was not given permission to enter the office, and
would have had to circumvent an electronic lock in order to enter. The Union
has not provided an innocent alternative explanation as to how its personnel entered
ATI’s offices. Instead of accepting that their attempts at persuasion had
failed, at least for the time being, the
Union arguably trespassed multiple times.
Second, Roldan testified that
the Union threatened to attend the tango festival in order to disrupt it. This
testimony is corroborated by the fact that Union organizer Jessica Lawlor
registered to attend the event. Moreover, Union
delegates allegedly threatened to confront ATI affiliates “and go to their
houses or companies.” Even if Roldan’s testimony on this point turns on his
credibility, such determinations are appropriate only at trial. If his
testimony is true, the Union’s threat
could easily be deemed coercive.
International
Housewares Association (IHA): According to the Hotel’s
substantiated accusations, the Union made several unwanted appearances at IHA
offices, and at one point IHA called the police. This finally convinced the
delegation to leave, but another one came back later the same day. Union
boycott coordinator Jessica Lawlor even testified that a delegate walked past
security to shout “shame on you!” to IHA president Phil Brandl. IHA vice
presidents Rampersad and Kurtis both testified that they were concerned that
the Union would picket the IHA’s trade show and occupy busses running to it.
Although they did not testify that a delegation explicitly threatened to do
this, Union delegate Jennifer Blatz testified that the Union had boarded RSNA
busses in order to leaflet people heading to a function. These facts could persuade a reasonable
fact-finder that the Union planned to do the same to IHA.
Even more support for the
Hotel comes from the Union’s leafleting of Rick Bayless’s restaurant. The
district court is correct that the leaflets’ content was literally true and protected
speech. The fliers do not imply that his restaurants failed inspection, and
they accurately quote from publicly available health reports. The Supreme Court
has warned us to be wary of circumscribing protected speech in an effort to
prevent unlawful labor activity. See DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575–88.
The Hotel responds that the
handbills did not reference the dispute between the Union and the Hotel, and
therefore they had minimal communicative effect. One of the basic aims of the
ban on secondary boycotting is to prevent labor disputes from spilling over
into unrelated disputes, such as the quality of Rick Bayless’s restaurants. On
balance, though, we agree with the Union that the act of passing out fliers
with truthful content would not in itself constitute an unfair labor practice.
However, the district court
overlooked the testimony of Jennifer Fite, the manager of the Frontera Grill,
who stated that Union delegates handed out the leaflets inside the restaurant
after they had made numerous failed attempts to see Bayless himself. This conduct could support an inference
that the Union committed trespass and harassed him.
It
is also important to point out that the Union’s visits to IHA’s exhibitors and
Bayless’s restaurants in a sense constitute tertiary labor activity. That is, the Union allegedly visited the affiliates
and the restaurants to pressure IHA to cease doing business with the Hotel.
The
Union’s strategy essentially widened the labor dispute to include affiliates of
customers of the Hotel.
This is exactly the sort of scorched-earth strategy that Section 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) was designed to avoid. Neutrals with only the most distant
connection to a struck employer must not be reduced to collateral damage in a
bruising labor battle. Congress has decided that the damage to the economy
caused by such a broadened conflict is unacceptable.
Unions
may inform third parties of their dispute with a primary employer in the hope
that they will discontinue their business relationship with the union's primary
target, they cannot pressure them to do so.
Reed
Exhibitions/Chicago Comic and Entertainment Expo: A reasonable jury could
conclude that the Union harassed Lance Fensterman during nine visits to
different comic book stores. He testified that the Union delegates told him
they would continue to follow him from store to store until he gave in to their
demands. Although Fensterman observed
that the delegates were polite, and the comic book stores were open to the
public, the repetitive nature of these visits could reasonably be considered a
form of harassment. We agree that union delegations may approach management
and decision-makers at secondary businesses, but they can-not do so nine times,
after they have already made their point.
Such conduct arguably crosses the line between communication intended to
persuade and picketing.
Conclusion:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed
the district court’s decision in part, and remanded for a trial regarding
whether certain of the defendant’s actions were coercive, whether any such coercive
conduct damaged the Hotel, and if so, to what extent.
The Employer
Takeaway:
The National Labor Relations Act expressly prohibits
"secondary boycotts," which are generally understood as an effort by
unions to coerce outside parties to "cease doing business" with the
company with whom the union has its primary labor dispute.
The National Labor Relations Act contains a proviso stating that the ban on “secondary boycotts” does
not “prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public. In other words,
striking against a primary employer engaged in a labor dispute with a union is
acceptable, as is publicizing such a strike. But coercion against neutral
parties is strictly forbidden.
Tertiary
Businesses cannot be a target of a dispute.
The law
is designed to balance a union's interest in publicizing its labor dispute to
the larger public against the danger of economic boycotts. The premise of the
federal ban of "secondary boycotts" is that "neutral" or
"secondary" employers, businesses that do business with the
"primary" employer, should not be harmed by union pressure tactics.
Consequently, while a union may inform tertiary parties of its dispute with the
primary employer in the hope that they will discontinue its business
relationship with the union's primary target, it cannot pressure them to do so.
With the proper information and specific details, employers
have options that would allow them to respond to these tactics.
Follow the link to read the entire decision: 520S. Michigan Ave. Associates, Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1, 13-1938, 2014 WL 3720253 (7th Cir. July 29, 2014)
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